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Abstract 
The Electoral College: Size Really Does Matter 
Alexander Kirk 
 
Committee members: Dr. George R. Goethals, Dr. Kenneth P Ruscio, Dr. David E. Wilkins 
 
The goal of this paper is to explore and ultimately convince the reader of the merits of the 
Wyoming Rule method of congressional apportionment as a method for altering the functioning 
of the Electoral College in United States presidential elections. This is conducted through an 
analysis of the role that the Electoral College has played throughout the history of American 
elections, in depth looks at four common proposals for changing or replacing the Electoral 
College, and finally discussion of the intricacies of the Wyoming Rule and the effects that it would 
have on American politics.  
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 In the throes of an election year, one can barely read, watch, or listen to the news without 
coverage of an election. We love elections in the United States. We elect for at least three levels 
of government, from mayor all the way up to President of the United States. We elect for at least 
two branches of government; from Congress, state legislatures, and city councils to president, 
governors, and mayors, and, sometimes, state judges. We do not only vote for people either. We 
vote for ballot measures and constitutional amendments, too. We vote all the time in the United 
States, so why does our most important election, that for president of the United States, seem 
so broken? Why does it seem like it is not even an election at all? Why do 538 people that never 
appear on television, never campaign for votes, and never hold office get to decide who the 
president is?  
 Perhaps the most important questions, however, are those of the “how” variety. How did 
we get here? How has the Electoral College played out in practice compared to its intended 
purpose and historical role? And finally, how do we fix it? Or in other words, how do we take a 
system, enshrined in the Constitution, and iron out its undemocratic tendencies? But even before 
that, we need to identify what are its undemocratic tendencies that need to be ironed out. There 
are no easy answers to these questions. Rational minds will disagree on the solutions, the scale 
of the problems, and even the problems themselves, but that only makes them that much more 
interesting to think, write, and speculate about.  
 So that is what we did. We thought about, wrote about, and speculated what some of 
those problems and solutions are. To start, there is an examination of the how we got here, 
starting with the Articles of Confederation and traversing through the final days of the 
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Constitutional Convention. Next, we move through the most notable elections in United States 
history, starting with the election of 1800. With each election, we examine how that election 
either shaped or was shaped by the Electoral College. As we move closer to the present day and 
the election of 2016, we start to consider political realities and how each election shapes the 
contours of public opinion on the Electoral College.  
 With the history out of the way, the proposals for the future come next. Five alternatives 
are postulated and explored in depth, each discussing the legality, winners and losers, impact on 
minority groups—both demographically and factionally, and the perceived issue that the 
proposal resolves. The proposals are named as follows: the automatic plan, direct election, the 
congressional district plan, and the interstate compact. Each gets an in-depth look at their virtues 
and shortfalls, as well as their chance of being implemented. However, there is one more plan 
that gets special attention.  
 The final plan is the Wyoming Rule plan. More outside-the-box than the four before it, 
the Wyoming Rule is my personal favorite for its combination of innovation and tradition that 
solves what I view as the most significant underlying issue of the Electoral College, the relative 
power of voters and states. In Chapter IV, the Wyoming Rule gets the full treatment of the four 
plans before it plus extra detail on implementation and the math behind it all.  
 Finally, I give the pitch on why the Wyoming Rule is the way forward for the Electoral 
College and the United States. As an unpartisan, amendment-free change to the Electoral 
College, I believe it not only has the best chance of becoming law but is also the technical 
correction the Electoral College needs to remain the electoral system of the United States for 
centuries to come. Without further ado, let us take a step back in time to the summer of 1787. 
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Chapter II: The Electoral College from Birth to Practice 
 A common refrain for those that are critical of the Electoral College is, “if we were starting 
over, we would never have come up with the Electoral College as a system for electing the 
president.” In order to adequately address that, we need to examine how the Framers got where 
they did. How did they come up with the Electoral College as a system of electing the chief 
executive of the United States when there were clearly much simpler and more straightforward 
answers available to them? The answer, as with most questions surrounding the creation of the 
United States Constitution, is compromise.  
 Article II, Section 1, Clauses 2 through 4 of the United States Constitution lay out how the 
President of the United States is to be elected. They read: 
“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a 
Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives 
to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or 
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United 
States, shall be appointed an Elector. 
The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two 
Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with 
themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the 
Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit 
sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the 
President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the 
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall 
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then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the 
President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors 
appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an 
equal Number of votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately 
chuse [sic] by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, 
then from the five highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse 
[sic] the President. But in chusing [sic] the President, the Votes shall be taken by 
States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; a Quorum for this 
Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the States, and 
a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after the 
Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the 
Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who 
have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse [sic] from them by Ballot the Vice 
President. 
The Congress may determine the Time of chusing [sic] the Electors, and the Day 
on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the 
United States.”1 
Although never mentioned specifically as the “Electoral College” throughout the entirety of the 
document, the system described in the clauses above has come to be known as the Electoral 
College. When examined through the modern lens, the system seems unnecessarily complex. 
                                                        
1 United States, The Constitution of the United States of America, 1787 (Public Domain, 1975), art. II, sec. 1, cl. 2-4, 
Apple Books. 
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Using voters to select other voters to then select the president seems like one step too many. 
We already select congressmen, why not have them select the president? We count the popular 
vote, why not use that instead? Before getting caught up in all the ways one can elect a public 
official, one needs to recognize how the situation that the Framers found themselves in differed 
from that of today.  
The Articles of Confederation 
 When the Constitution was written in the summer of 1787 the Framers were not working 
from a blank slate. Originally tasked with amending the Articles of Confederation, which had 
governed the newly independent states since its ratification in 1781, many of the delegates to 
the Constitutional Convention traveled to Philadelphia with the intention of doing just that.2 
Faced with impending fiscal crises from the threat of defaulting on loans from the French and 
Dutch, Congress nearly passed a federal impost on goods being imported into the states on two 
occasions, 1782 and 1786.3 The first was singlehandedly quashed by Rhode Island and the second 
by New York, fearful of the effect a new impost would have on the impost already being levied 
on goods entering New York City.4 The latter failure to establish a federal tax proved to be the 
last straw, finally bringing to bear the shortcomings of the Articles of Confederation and 
triggering calls for a convention to amend them.5  
Just as the financial crisis was unfolding, Shays’ Rebellion began to take form in 
Massachusetts, furthering the new nation’s domestic troubles.6 Faced with fiscal austerity and 
                                                        
2 Richard R. Beeman, Plain, Honest Men: The Making of the American Constitution (New York: Random House, 
2010), chap. 1, Kindle. 
3 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 1. 
4 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 1. 
5 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 1. 
6 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 1. 
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aggressive tax collection by the state government, Captain Daniel Shays led a group of rural 
Massachusetts men in a call to march on the government arsenal in Springfield and threaten an 
armed insurgency.7 Eventually put down by a private militia organized by Massachusetts 
governor James Bowdoin, the episode nonetheless further spurred calls for something to be done 
with the Articles of Confederation.8 While the conflicts between the states on import tariffs and 
the inability to raise an army to defend the country were perhaps the most salient reasons for 
ditching the Articles of Confederation, a multitude of other factors did as well, including the 
patchwork of laws and inconsistent treatment that American Indian tribes were subject to and 
received from the various states.  
Just as the dual crises were unfolding up north, a small group of delegates was gathering 
in Annapolis, Maryland on September 11, 1786 to discuss another shortcoming of the Articles of 
Confederation, the ability to establish uniform commercial regulations.9 Although only five states 
sent delegates to the convention, leaving it far short of a quorum, the 12 men that did show up 
were some of the staunchest supporters of a stronger central government in the United States.10 
Led by Alexander Hamilton, John Dickinson, James Madison, and Edmund Randolph, the 12 
delegates prepared a letter for the Continental Congress requesting that a convention in May of 
the following year convene in Philadelphia to amend the Articles of Confederation.11 However, 
some of the men, especially Hamilton and Madison, had more ambitious plans in mind. Instead 
of simply amending the Articles, they intended to scrap them altogether and create an entirely 
                                                        
7 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 1. 
8 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 1. 
9 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 1. 
10 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 1. 
11 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 1. 
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new government that was much less favorable to the states.12 When the proposed convention 
won the approval of the Continental Congress in early 1787, a small group of men led by Madison 
and Hamilton and joined by Edmund Randolph, Gouverneur Morris, James Wilson, and Robert 
Morris hatched plans to create a wholly new government.13  
The Constitutional Convention 
 By some historical accounts, there was no fewer than three instances in which the method 
of selection for the chief executive was discussed at the Constitutional Convention. The first such 
instance came during the first discussion of the nature and powers of the executive branch of the 
government. On Monday, June 4, 1787, James Wilson of Pennsylvania led the charge for a 
unitary, powerful chief executive over the objections of significantly more well-known delegates 
such as Edmund Randolph and George Mason of Virginia.14 Having settled on the nature of the 
executive, the delegates started plotting out exactly how that executive would be chosen. 
Although most supported some form of election by the national legislature, it was James Wilson, 
whose name will come up often throughout this discussion, who first proposed direct election by 
the people.15 Predictably, however, not a single delegate supported Wilson’s proposal.16 In 
response to the resounding rejection of his plan for direct election by the people, Wilson laid the 
groundwork for what would become the Electoral College.  
Wilson proposed dividing the states into districts that would select “electors” who would 
eventually meet and select the chief executive.17 The electors, he reasoned, would be of superior 
                                                        
12 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 1. 
13 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 1. 
14 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 7. 
15 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 7. 
16 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 7. 
17 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 7. 
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knowledge and sufficiently removed from their communities to be able to make a wise choice 
while also giving the people at least an indirect say in the choice of the chief executive.18 Wilson 
pictured these electoral districts holding elections for the electors, meaning that the people 
inhabiting a district would vote for the elector they wanted to represent them when the 
president was selected.19 While not exactly the direct election of the president that Wilson 
preferred, the elector method still gave the people a voice. Favoring a strong and independent 
executive, Wilson wanted to avoid the selection of the president by the national legislature, 
fearing that the president would simply become a pawn of Congress and unable to act 
independently and forcefully.20 The delegates recognized that other, more pressing issues 
needed to be attended to, so they left it for discussion later.21 
On July 17, Maryland’s Luther Martin offered a variation of Wilson’s proposal, proposing 
that the electors be selected by the state legislatures instead of the people in the states.22 If the 
president was simply elected by the state legislatures, he would be nothing more than a 
powerbroker between the interests of the individual and factitious states.23 For that reason, this 
proposal, too, was similarly rejected without further discussion on the topic, bringing a quick end 
to the second mention of selection of the president.24 
The third time that the issue of selecting the president was discussed was in early 
September, not by the whole of the convention, but by the recently created Committee on 
                                                        
18 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 7. 
19 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 7. 
20 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 7. 
21 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 7. 
22 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 12. 
23 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 12. 
24 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 12. 
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Postponed Parts (certainly the most well-named of the committees conducting business at the 
Convention.)25 Arriving late, John Dickinson of Delaware threw a wrench into the Committee’s 
consensus on the selection of the president by the national legislature.26 Looking ahead to the 
ratification fight, Dickinson predicted that people would refuse to give such immense power to a 
chief executive that they could not choose directly.27 It is here that Madison jumped into action. 
Drawing on Wilson’s proposal for election by a slate of electors, Madison sketched out a method 
for selecting the president.28 The final recommendation of that committee, delivered and 
debated on September 5, 1787, read: 
“Hold his office during the term of four years, and together with the Vice-
President, chosen for the same term, be elected in the following manner, viz: Each 
State shall appoint in such manner as its Legislature may direct, a number of 
electors equal to the whole number of Senators and members of the House of 
Representatives, to which the State may be entitled in the Legislature. The 
Electors shall meet in their respective State and vote by ballot for two persons, of 
whom one at least shall be not be an inhabitant of the same State with 
themselves; and they shall make a list of all persons voted for, and of the number 
of votes for each. The Person having the greatest number of votes shall be the 
President, if such a number be a majority of that of the electors; and if there be 
more than one who have such a majority, and have an equal number of votes, 
                                                        
25 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 16. 
26 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 16. 
27 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 16. 
28 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 16. 
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then the Senate shall choose by ballot one of them for President: but if no person 
has a majority, then from the five highest on the list, the Senate shall choose by 
ballot the President. And in every case after the choice of the President, the 
person having the greatest number of votes shall be Vice-President.”29 
If the text sounds familiar to that in the Constitution, that is because it is. The only significant 
change that came out of the full debate following the Committee’s report was that it would be 
the House of Representatives that would choose the president while the Senate would choose 
the vice-president.30 However, as a sort of compromise on the issue that favored small states 
supportive of election by the Senate, each state delegation would get one vote, regardless of the 
size of that delegation.31 Except for those two changes, Madison’s proposal coming from the 
Committee on Postponed Parts is the one that ends up making it into the final text, creating the 
Electoral College that persists to this day.  
 A common line of attack on the Electoral College today is that the Framers distrusted the 
general American populace to make an informed decision about who should be the leader of the 
country. In truth, it was only a small minority of the delegates who believed that the ordinary 
citizens were not intelligent enough to make such a decision.32 Instead, most of them believed 
that ordinary Americans were simply too ignorant to choose the president.33 Even though the 
number of newspapers in the new republic was growing rapidly, most were still concerned 
primarily with local matters.34 Additionally, the “news” that came out of other regions of the 
                                                        
29 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 16. 
30 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 16. 
31 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 16. 
32 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 16. 
33 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 16. 
34 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 20. 
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country was often not even news at all, accounting events weeks or months after they 
happened.35 This, the Framers believed, combined with the sheer size of the country made it 
logistically impossible to create an informed electorate.  
 Despite their foresight in avoiding direct election by an uninformed electorate, the 
Framers grossly misestimated how often the contingency plan that they quibbled about so 
ferociously would be needed. George Mason of Virginia quipped that, “Nineteen times in twenty 
the president would be chosen by the Senate,” referring to the scenario in which no candidate 
receives a majority of the electoral votes or two candidates tie with the most votes.36 Instead, in 
the 58 presidential elections in United States history, only two have resulted in an electoral vote 
outcome that needed to be settled by the House of Representatives, a far cry from the 95% of 
elections that Mason had predicted.37 Mason also argued that election by the Senate would, 
“convert that body into a real and dangerous aristocracy,” instead favoring election by the House 
of Representatives.38 Wilson, still believing in the importance of popular will in the election of 
the president, also favored election by the House, as is was the body more closely tied to the 
popular will.39 In the end, it was Roger Sherman of Connecticut that put together the system of 
votes by delegation that eventually won the day.40 Proposed at the end of the day on September 
6, Sherman’s proposal was no one’s first choice, but after informal gatherings of delegates on the 
                                                        
35 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 20. 
36 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 16. 
37 “Electoral College Results,” Electoral College, The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, last 
reviewed March 5, 2020, https://www.archives.gov/electoral-college/results. 
38 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 16. 
39 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 16. 
40 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 16. 
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sidelines of the Convention worked out that Sherman’s was the least-worst option, a consensus 
eventually formed around his idea.41 
 An interesting note regarding the Electoral College is the relatively little coverage it 
received during the ratification fight following the conclusion of the Convention. Of the 85 essays 
comprising The Federalist Papers, only one—Hamilton’s 68—considers the issue of the Electoral 
College.42 Hamilton expounds on the virtues of the system as designed in avoiding the “cabal, 
intrigue, and corruption” that are an existential threat to the survival of republican government.43 
He points out that because the electors are to meet in the state in which they are elected and 
not altogether in the seat of government, it, “will expose them much less to heats and ferments” 
of the people than they would if they met in one place.44 Hamilton notes the specific and 
temporary nature of the electors as a virtue as well. Because their only role is to select the 
president, neither the electors nor the president himself would have much ulterior motive for 
attempting to sway the outcome of the vote or changing behavior in order to curry favor with 
more permanent and powerful individuals such as senators or representatives.45 
The Role of the Popular Vote 
 A common feature of early American elections, especially those in the first part of the 19th 
century, was a lack of popular votes. It was not until 1824, the tenth presidential election in 
American history, that the Federal Archives even include a count of the popular vote in official 
election results.46 It was not until the election of 1868, following the Civil War and the 
                                                        
41 Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 16. 
42 Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers (Public Domain, 1788), Federalist No. 68., Apple Books. 
43 Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, Federalist No. 68. 
44 Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, Federalist No. 68. 
45 Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, Federalist No. 68. 
46 The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “Electoral College Results.” 
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reconstruction of most of the southern states, that every state chose electors via some form of 
popular vote, almost a century after the first presidential election in United States history.47  
Election Total Using Popular Vote 
Total Casting Electoral 
Votes 
Percentage Using Popular 
Vote 
1788 6 10 60.00% 
1792 6 15 40.00% 
1796 9 16 56.25% 
1800 6 16 37.50% 
1804 11 17 64.71% 
1808 10 17 58.82% 
1812 9 18 50.00% 
1816 10 19 52.63% 
1820 15 24 62.50% 
1824 18 24 75.00% 
1828 22 24 91.67% 
1832 23 24 95.83% 
1836 25 26 96.15% 
1840 25 26 96.15% 
1844 25 26 96.15% 
1848 29 30 96.67% 
1852 30 31 96.77% 
                                                        
47 The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “Electoral College Results.” 
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1856 30 31 96.77% 
1860 32 33 96.97% 
1864 25 25 100.00% 
1868 34 34 100.00% 
As one can see from the table, the number of states using the popular vote fluctuated until 1812, 
bottoming out at half of the states and increasing until just one state, South Carolina, held out 
until after the Civil War.48 The election of 1864 saw a decrease in the number of states casting 
votes as eleven had seceded during the Civil War. Starting with the election of 1864 and 
continuing to the present day, every state has used the popular vote in the state in order to select 
electors in some way.49 
Winner Take All 
 The ability of states to choose for themselves how their electors will be chosen is a power 
granted by the same passage in the Constitution that creates the electoral system for selecting 
the president.50 It is for this reason that many states and their legislatures were able to avoid 
using the popular vote to select electors and thus concentrate power in the hands of state 
political parties via the state legislature. However, given the latitude that states have in deciding 
how their electors will be selected, it is rather peculiar that nearly every state quickly settled on 
a winner-take-all system. When considered in the context of the early American republic though, 
the reasons become clearer. Designed at a time in which people held great pride in their state of 
origin and political parties were nowhere to be seen, states would work to maximize their sway 
                                                        
48 The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “Electoral College Results.” 
49 The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “Electoral College Results.” 
50 United States, The Constitution, art. II, sec. 1, cl. 2. 
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on the national stage. The best way to do that would be selecting electors as a bloc that would 
vote together, ensuring that no matter how slim a margin a candidate won a state by, that state 
could maximize its preference for that candidate. As political parties began to take form, a similar 
logic was applied. Seeking to maximize support for their preferred candidate, party leaders 
designed systems that would effectively disenfranchise voters in the minority faction in their 
states and give their candidate the best chance of winning nationally.  
Faithless Electors 
 In all states but Maine and Nebraska, the party of the candidate who wins the popular 
vote gets to have its preselected electors appointed as the state’s electors. Those electors usually 
vote with the outcome of the popular vote in their state, ensuring that the candidate that wins 
the state essentially receives all the electoral votes. Beyond just allowing the parties to select the 
electors, some states include civil penalties for so-called “faithless electors” that fail to vote with 
the popular vote in their state.51 However, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit recently ruled, states cannot force or coerce their electors into voting a certain way.52 As 
the Constitution dictates, states have absolute authority over deciding how those electors will be 
appointed and selected, but once they are selected, they hold no sway over their actions, just 
like any other public official.53 While faithless electors often make headlines—there were ten 
defectors in the 2016 election, the most ever—they have never changed the outcome of an 
                                                        
51 Editorial Board, “Voters have concerns about the electoral college. The Supreme Court is clearing one thing up,” 
The Washington Post, January 22, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/voters-have-concerns-about-
the-electoral-college-the-supreme-court-is-clearing-one-thing-up/2020/01/22/115c20da-3c79-11ea-baca-
eb7ace0a3455_story.html. 
52 Editorial Board, “Voters have concerns.” 
53 United States, The Constitution, art. II, sec. 1, cl. 2. 
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election.54 However, the risk is always present so long as faithless electors remain an aspect of 
the Electoral College, as the Framers designed it.  
 With such a unique system, it is expected that there are bound to be some unanticipated 
and sometimes counterintuitive election outcomes. I will now go through some of the more 
interesting ones in terms of their Electoral College outcome and their implications on United 
States politics and elections, starting with the election of 1800. 
19th Century Elections 
 The fourth presidential election in United States history featured a deeply unpopular 
incumbent in President John Adams, and another founding father challenging him in Vice 
President Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson “chose” Aaron Burr as his running mate, a career political 
operative from New York, a key swing state in the election of 1800, with few concrete positions 
on the issues of the day. However, as the election took place prior to the passage of the Twelfth 
Amendment, electors cast two electoral votes each without indicating in any way whom they 
wanted to be president and vice president.55 For the most part, both major parties had figured 
out how to game the system to ensure that both their preferred president and vice president 
were elected together. Electors from the party were instructed to choose both candidates on 
their ballots while one elector would not select whoever was to be the vice president. This would 
leave the leading vote-getter the president and the vice president one vote behind. For whatever 
reason, an elector for the Republicans in the election of 1800 that was supposed to vote for 
someone other than Burr did not, leaving Jefferson and Burr in a tie and throwing the election 
                                                        
54 The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “Electoral College Results.” 
55 The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “Electoral College Results.” 
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into the House of Representatives. Still controlled by the Federalists, the House went through 36 
ballots and an intervention from Hamilton before finally electing Jefferson the third President of 
the United States with Burr as his vice president.56 The entire episode spurred Jefferson to 
propose the Twelfth Amendment, creating an independent election for vice president and 
ensuring that the president and vice president will always be from the same party if a majority of 
electoral votes are won.57 The election of 1800 was and will remain the only election in American 
history that ended in a majority tie, as the passage of the Twelfth Amendment guaranteed that 
no election can end that way again.58 
 The next election that will be explored is the first of the five “mismatches” in which the 
winner of the popular vote does not win the electoral vote and thus the presidency. It is also the 
only other election that has ever been decided by the House of Representatives. The election of 
1824 was a four-man race between John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson, William H. Crawford, 
and Henry Clay.59 When the votes came in, Jackson had won a plurality of both popular and 
electoral votes, but fell 32 electoral votes short of a majority.60 Following the provision of the 
Twelfth Amendment that the top three vote-getters move into the House of Representatives, 
Henry Clay was disqualified. What followed was what Jackson would decry as a “corrupt bargain” 
in which Henry Clay pledged his support to Adams in exchange for being appointed Secretary of 
State.61 Adams would go on to win the election in the House of Representatives despite being 
                                                        
56 The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “Electoral College Results.” 
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the second-highest vote-getter in the initial election.62 Adams’ luck would not continue, however, 
as Jackson would come back and trounce him in the election of 1828.63 While not a “mismatch 
election” in the sense that the person that won the popular vote lost the electoral vote, the 
election of 1824 still resulted in the person that won the popular vote did not become President 
of the United States.64 Although the election took a detour through the United States House of 
Representatives before arriving at that conclusion, the end result was still the same as any other 
mismatch election.  
 The election of 1860 is the third that provided an interesting electoral-popular 
breakdown. Like the election of 1824, 1860 featured four candidates: Abraham Lincoln, John C. 
Breckinridge, John Bell, and Stephen A. Douglas.65 Unlike 1824, Lincoln would win 60% of the 
electoral vote with only 40% of the popular vote.66 As we move through history, we will see that 
these “win more” elections are common, in which the winner of the popular vote wins a plurality 
of the popular but a majority of the electoral, essentially creating a decisive winner where there 
was not one. The interesting part of the election of 1860 is that even if Lincoln’s opposition had 
been united behind a single candidate, he still would have won the electoral vote, only losing 
California, Oregon, and New Jersey’s combined 14 electoral votes.67 Lincoln could have won a 
presidential election against an opponent that won 60% of the popular vote. While it has never 
really even come close to happening, an election between two candidates that results in a loser 
that won 60% percent of the popular vote would likely result in a profound decline in trust in 
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American democracy that would either seriously threaten its continued existence or provide the 
impetus for monumental change to the way presidents are elected.  
 The election of 1876 is the second of the mismatch elections in the United States. 1876 is 
also the only of the five mismatch elections in which the loser of the election won a majority of 
the popular vote; in all other cases the popular vote winner has only won a plurality.68 Contested 
between Rutherford B. Hayes and Samuel J. Tilden, the 1876 election is also the only one that 
has been decided by a single electoral vote, handing Hayes the win despite a three-percentage 
point popular margin in favor of Tilden.69 
Just four years later, in the election of 1880, the opposite occurred in which a tiny popular 
vote margin resulted in a large electoral margin. Separated by fewer than two thousand popular 
votes out of nine million, James A. Garfield and Winfield Scott Hancock were separated by 59 
electoral votes, or 29 more than were needed for Garfield to win a majority.70 
 The election of 1888 was the third election that would result in a mismatch, although not 
as wide as the one in 1876. Benjamin Harrison would lose the popular vote by less than a 
percentage point to his opponent Grover Cleveland but would still go on to win 58% of the 
electoral vote and the presidency.71 The elections of 1824, 1876, and 1888 would be the only 
elections that result in mismatches until the turn of the 21st century over one hundred years later.  
20th Century Elections 
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 Moving into the 20th century, the election of 1912 was yet another in which four 
candidates received a significant number of popular votes, although only three received electoral 
votes. The winner, Woodrow Wilson, would win less than 42% of the popular vote but over 80% 
of the electoral vote, owing to an opposition divided between Theodore Roosevelt and William 
Howard Taft.72 The 40-percentage point spread between the popular and electoral vote shares 
was easily the largest in the United States until that time and would only be surpassed just slightly 
in 1980 by Ronald Reagan’s dominant victory over Jimmy Carter.73 Unlike in Lincoln’s election in 
which a similar popular vote share would have won even with a united opposition, Wilson won 
many of his states with less than 40% of the popular vote in that state, indicating that had he 
been running against a united opposition, he would not have won.74 Against a united opposition, 
Wilson would have lost all but Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia—the 11 states that seceded from the 
Union to start the American Civil War—winning only 126 electoral votes out of the 266 needed 
to win the presidency.75 
 1968 sticks out as another curious election as it showed the power that regional 
candidates can have on the outcome of the election. Contested between Richard Nixon, Hubert 
Humphrey, and George Wallace, the 1968 election featured a strong regional candidate in 
Wallace. With only 43% of the popular vote, Nixon would win both the plurality of the popular 
and a majority of the electoral.76 While it is impossible to say whether Wallace’s presence in the 
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race hurt Humphrey or Nixon more, Wallace’s 13% of the popular and 46 electoral votes showed 
that a regional candidate with limited nationwide support could materially impact the outcome 
of an election. Had Wallace’s votes gone for Humphrey instead, Nixon still would have won the 
election although Humphrey would have polled 55% of the popular vote, putting Nixon’s victory 
closer to Lincoln’s in 1860 than Wilson’s in 1912 in terms of electoral-popular math.77 
 1992 is the final of the 20th century elections that will be examined. Featuring Bill Clinton 
and George H. W. Bush, the election of 1992 also included independent Ross Perot. Although not 
winning any electoral college votes, Perot would win nearly 19% of the national popular vote.78 
Whether Perot’s candidacy handed the election to Clinton by hurting Bush’s vote shares in 
important states is up for debate, but Perot’s strong showing nonetheless stirred discussion 
about the role that third-party candidates play in American elections. As discussed earlier, the 
Electoral College essentially acts as a “win more” device, allowing a candidate that sometimes 
falls far short of winning a majority of the popular votes to win a majority of the electoral votes. 
This is certainly the case for Clinton as well, winning only 43% of the popular vote but 68% of the 
electoral vote.79  
21st Century Elections 
 The election of 2000 will stand in infamy for many reasons: hanging chads, dimpled chads, 
time zone differences in the Florida panhandle, you name it. But there is one event that had not 
happened in over a century that is of interest for its relationship to the Electoral College. 
Contested between George W. Bush and Al Gore, the election of 2000 was the fourth mismatch 
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election in United States history, with only half a percentage point in the popular vote separating 
the candidates and Bush only two electoral votes over a majority.80 What ultimately came down 
to 537 votes in Bush’s favor in Florida decided who would become president of the United States 
and kicked off a fresh round of criticism of the Electoral College.81 However, the 2000 election 
would only foreshadow the things to come. 
 The election of 2016 provides the last and perhaps most important lesson for the future 
of the Electoral College in American politics, that is the extent to which someone can lose the 
popular vote and still win the presidency. Contested between two deeply unpopular candidates 
in Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, the 2016 election would result in the fifth mismatched 
election in the United States. With almost three million popular votes and two-percentage points 
favoring her, Clinton would end up losing the electoral vote to Trump by 12-percentage points.82 
Contested during a period of intense polarization of American politics and resulting in a much 
wider margin than Bush defeated Gore by in 2000, the 2016 election seems to be a harbinger of 
things to come. 
As Americans continue to move into more polarized and entrenched political camps, the 
possibility for even wider mismatches is greater than ever. For example, as Democrats continue 
pushing to the left and running up huge margins in states like California and New York, they will 
continue winning increasingly large swathes of votes without any additional gain. Combined with 
traditionally Republican states like Texas becoming more diverse and urbanized, trends that tend 
to correlate with increasing support for Democratic candidates, the margins by which 
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Republicans win those states will decrease, further skewing the popular vote in favor of the 
Democrats without any change in the electoral vote.83 Additionally, the 2016 election saw a 
record ten electors cast their votes for someone other than the person that won the popular vote 
in their state, highlighting the risk that in a closer election, faithless electors breaking with the 
vote in their state could have a serious impact on the final results and trigger a “stolen” election 
that raises serious doubts about the efficacy of an electoral system that places the ultimate 
decision in the hands of 538 people.84 
With an understanding of how the Electoral College came into being and the way that it 
has played out in practice throughout American history, we can move into the present. Following 
the election of 2016 and the unprecedented disparity between the popular vote and the electoral 
vote, calls for something new have arisen. Ranging from the abolition of the Electoral College to 
simple tweaks of its functioning, the alternatives that have been proposed all seek to remedy 
perceived shortcomings of the Electoral College. Thus, it is vital that any discussion of how to 
change the system starts with a discussion of the system itself, just as we have done. With that 
out of the way, we can leave the history of American elections behind and see how those 
elections might play out in the future. 
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Chapter III: The Alternatives 
 With an understanding of where the Electoral College came from and how it has played 
out in practice as an electoral tool, we can move to consider some alternatives that have been 
proposed were the Electoral College to be replaced. The four proposals that will be covered in 
this chapter—the automatic plan, direct election, the congressional district plan, and the 
interstate compact—have all been floated in one form or the other as possible alternatives by 
authorities in media, journalism, and political science. Each proposal will be evaluated on a 
number of measures including legality, winners and losers, impact on minority groups, and how 
it addresses some of the perceived issues of the system it would be hypothetically replacing, the 
Electoral College.  
The Reasons for Change 
 The reasons for seeking an alternative to the Electoral College are numerous and come in 
both partisan and nonpartisan flavors. A common partisan one, especially among Democrats, is 
that two of the last five elections have been “stolen” from their candidate due to the quirks of 
the Electoral College. In both 2000 and 2016, Al Gore and Hillary Clinton won a plurality of the 
popular vote without winning a majority of the Electoral College vote which instead awarded the 
presidency to George W. Bush and Donald Trump, respectively.85 This argument, taken alone, 
almost certainly would find no support on the other side of the aisle. If Democrats want to change 
the electoral system of the United States, which was fully known and transparent to all 
candidates and parties, to suit their candidates and their electoral prospects, why should 
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Republicans not fight all the same for the maintenance of the system that has delivered them 
40% of the last five elections and appears likely to do so again in 2020? 
 As recently as the 1970s, however, Congress made a serious effort at eliminating the 
Electoral College in its entirety. Under the stewardship of Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, doing 
away with the Electoral College in favor of a nationwide popular vote was a nonpartisan issue.86 
Although the effort was ultimately unsuccessful, it remained a non-partisan issue up until the 
election of 2000, when the Republican Party was prepared to renew efforts against the Electoral 
College had Al Gore won a majority of the electoral vote while losing the popular vote as polls 
had predicted at the time.87 When, in fact, the opposite happened, political realities took hold 
and the Republican Party moved strongly in favor of the Electoral College.88 
 As for the nonpartisan arguments, most boil down to a simple concern: that the Electoral 
College is antithetical to democracy because it sometimes fails to reflect the popular will of the 
people. When framed as an afront to democracy and not as a partisan issue, the arguments for 
doing away with the Electoral College in favor of another system hold much higher levels of face 
validity as the motivations of advocates cannot be dismissed as strictly partisan. However, even 
in the context of nonpartisan arguments and agreements about the nature of the Electoral 
College, one can never divorce the virtue of such a change for American democracy from the 
reality such a change would have on the alignment of political power.  
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 One final note before addressing the proposals mentioned above: no analysis will be 
conducted as to who would have won in specified elections if such a system existed except for 
purposes of illustrating the workings of the system in the context of an actual election. The 
statement made earlier regarding an electoral system that has clear and consistent rules that are 
transparent and known to all involved would apply in all situations as they happen, but judging 
campaigns and election outcomes of the past on a different set of rules that was unknown to 
participants would be superfluous. Saying that under a congressional district plan, Hillary Clinton 
would have won the Electoral College by a certain amount is futile because it assumes that 
everything leading up to the election would have remained exactly the same. The campaigns, the 
advertising spending, and even the platforms of the respective candidates and parties would all 
be different if the path to the presidency was altered. Simply changing the rules of the game ex 
post and analyzing the results would not provide any reliable information on the impacts of such 
a change, so it will not be done in this paper. 
The Automatic Plan 
 The first alternative that will be discussed, the automatic plan, is the simplest and most 
straightforward of the plans, both in terms of execution and deviation from the Electoral College 
of today. The automatic plan leaves everything about the Electoral College intact except for the 
use of electors that actually cast the votes. As currently constructed, the Electoral College 
consists of states determining on their own how they will select the electors that will cast the 
votes for president.89 The number of electors a state is permitted to allocate is a straightforward 
calculation of the number of representatives a state is allocated in the House of Representatives 
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plus the number of senators a state is allocated in the Senate.90 As every state is allocated two 
senators and a minimum of one representative, the fewest electors that a state can allocate is 
three while the most populous state, California, is allocated 55 for each of the 53 representatives 
that the state sends to the House and the two senators it sends to the Senate.91 Under the 
passage laying out the method of selection in the Constitution, it is made clear that states have 
full discretion in how those electors are chosen as long as “no Senator or Representative, or 
Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States” is appointed to the role.92 
These electors, once appointed by their respective states, are to meet in the state in which they 
are selected from and cast their votes for the President of the United States.93 In theory, as 
Hamilton discusses in Federalist 68, “A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens 
from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite 
to such complicated investigations” as to who should be elected president.94 Additionally, 
Hamilton explains that the reasons for having the electors meet in their respective states and not 
all together is that “this detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats and 
ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people, than if they were all to be 
convened at one time, in one place.”95 However, the first aspect of Hamilton’s reasoning quickly 
proved to be detached from the realities of government.  
 As early as the first competitive presidential election in United States history in 1796, 
many of the states themselves and the parties that ran them decided that it was in their best 
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interest that the entirety of a state’s electoral votes go for a particular candidate. By 1796, 12 of 
the 16 states allocated their electoral votes in a winner-take-all fashion and three of those that 
did not only allocated one vote for the candidate of the opposite party.96 Regardless of how the 
parties were represented amongst the voters of the state and, more specifically, amongst the 
legislators in the state legislature, the majority party would ensure that all of the votes went for 
a single candidate. This practice served two power-maximization purposes. The first was the 
power of the party selecting the slate of electors that would choose the president while the 
second was the power of the state in relation to other states. While it seems politically natural 
that a party would seek to give their candidate every advantage in an election by maximizing 
their vote count, the power of the individual states was a contentious issue that extended to the 
power a state had in the federal government. Thus, the practice of slating electors as a group 
essentially becomes an application of game theory where the implementation of a winner-take-
all system in one state drives all the other states to implement the same system to avoid being 
left behind and relatively weaker. As a result of this gamesmanship among the states, today 48 
states allocate their electors via a winner-take-all system with the only exceptions being Maine 
and Nebraska, which will be discussed later.97 
 The automatic plan seeks to make this officially unofficial practice of winner-take-all 
legally binding by “automatically” allocating the votes that electors cast today for the candidates 
that win the popular votes in each of the states and thus eliminating the need for electors. While 
some versions of the plan would maintain the discretion that states currently hold in allocating 
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their electors by only eliminating the individuals from the process, the version of the automatic 
plan being discussed here would involve moving every state to a winner-take-all system. The 
perceived fault of the Electoral College that this system would remedy is the instance of the 
“faithless elector,” or an elector that does not vote for the candidate that he or she had pledged 
to vote for when selected as an elector. However, in the course of United States presidential 
elections, only 165 so-called faithless electors have ever cast electoral votes.98 63 of those votes 
were cast in 1872 when Horace Greeley died after election day but before the Electoral College 
cast their votes.99 When it came time to vote, only three of his 66 pledged electors voted for 
him.100  Additionally, 75 of those faithless electors were for vice presidential candidates, not 
presidential ones, and they have never impacted the outcome of an election, only altering the 
final electoral vote tallies.101 Although a relatively minor “problem” in the grand scheme of the 
Electoral College, faithless electors may have their power of discretion over their votes 
reaffirmed or stripped away in the coming months as the Supreme Court hears conflicting 
appeals from two district courts, one in Colorado and another in Washington, regarding the 
control that states have over their electors after they have been chosen.102 If the court rules that 
states can legally restrict the voting behavior of their electors after their selection, the automatic 
plan will be enacted in all but name and without a constitutional amendment, which would be 
required to implement the plan in its entirety.  
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 Beyond the elimination of risk of a faithless elector altering the outcome of an election 
with a vote that goes against the candidate they were selected for, the automatic plan would 
only change electoral practice for the two states that do not select electors strictly on the 
outcome of the statewide popular vote: Maine and Nebraska. Both states use a combination of 
the statewide popular vote and the popular vote in each of its congressional districts to select 
electors, the details of which will be addressed in the congressional district plan.103 The 
implementation of the automatic plan, which would require a constitutional amendment that is 
passed with two-thirds majorities in both houses of Congress and the ratification of three 
quarters of the states in order to become law, would force Maine and Nebraska to give up their 
current systems and require all states to give up the power to determine for themselves how to 
select and instruct electors, although there are versions in which this would not be the case, as 
mentioned above.  
 The winners under such a plan would be those that believe the Electoral College is still a 
valid and useful method of selecting the president but believe that its kinks, like independent 
electors, should be ironed out. Thinking more politically, Republicans would generally win in this 
situation as they would solidify the functioning of the Electoral College and could claim to be 
tweaking it enough to bring it into the 21st century and away from the subtle paternalism of the 
18th. Losers under the automatic plan would be the states that have now had part of their power 
guaranteed under the Constitution further subsumed by the federal government. Another 
segment would be those that desired deeper changes to the electoral system or complete 
replacement of the Electoral College as the implementation of the automatic plan would require 
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the immense amount of effort and campaigning that is associated with passing a constitutional 
amendment for very little change.  
 The impact on minority groups when compared to the Electoral College as currently 
constructed would be unchanged. As the main structures of the Electoral College would remain 
in place, nothing regarding voting districts, gerrymandering, or voting access would be neither 
positively nor negatively impacted. As a result, the automatic plan would have no effect on any 
groups. 
 As for the issues of the Electoral College the automatic plan would be resolving, only the 
phenomenon of faithless electors and the so-far unrealized risk of them altering the outcome of 
an election would be corrected. The automatic plan is by far the simplest of those that will be 
detailed in this paper in terms of deviation from the system of today and the limited impact it 
would have on the American electoral system reflects that. In the next plan, however, the polar 
opposite will be the case. 
Direct Election 
 Also known as the national popular vote, direct election of the president is the most 
logically straightforward of the options that will be discussed here. In a democracy, it simply 
makes sense that the people would choose the president by casting their votes for the candidate 
of their choosing and whoever gets the most votes wins. However, as many things that involve 
the United States government and politics, it’s not that simple. Moving from the Electoral College 
of today to the direct election of the president would entail not only a constitutional amendment, 
but consideration of what happens when no single candidate wins a majority, how to account for 
the rise of third party candidates, how the strategies of parties would change, and how the role 
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of the states would change in the American federal system. Additionally, the United States would 
become the largest country in the world that directly elects its head of government, a logistical 
challenge not only for the casting and counting of votes, but also for the physical and cyber 
security of a system that would become highly centralized. While the challenges are certainly 
numerous, one must also examine the purported virtues of such a system in order to make a 
complete judgement of its merits.  
 In theory, the implementation of direct election via a nationwide popular vote would be 
relatively straightforward. Following the passage of a constitutional amendment that requires 
the same two-thirds of Congress and three quarters of states to become law, one should be able 
to create an infrastructure that takes all the vote totals flowing in from around the country on 
the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of every other even-numbered year and 
start counting. Even the infrastructure and the counting would not be all that difficult to come 
by: every news channel covering Election Day has a running popular vote tally. The Federal 
Election Commission and National Archives keeps vote totals by state for every United States 
federal election as well, which is part of the reason that one can look back through history and 
see which elections resulted in split elections where one candidate won a majority of the 
electoral vote but lost the popular vote to another candidate.104 Moving to the direct election of 
the president would eliminate the phenomenon of the mismatch election and, with it, faithless 
electors. It is this reason, the ability to eliminate mismatch elections that appear to be antithetical 
to democracy, that is most appealing to many that support the direct election of the president. 
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However, there are many concerns and shortcomings that would need to be ironed out before 
such a plan could come into effect without a hitch.  
 The first such issue would arise when pluralities occur in an election. If no single candidate 
can claim to have the support of a majority of the people, who becomes the president? In 19 of 
the 58 presidential elections that have taken place throughout the history of the United States, 
no candidate won a majority of the popular vote.105 Only once in the 39 other elections has the 
candidate that won a majority of the popular vote not won a majority of the electoral, in 1876.106 
Although the Electoral College does have the ability to flip an election and give a candidate that 
did not win the popular vote the electoral majority, it is historically much more likely to create a 
majority for the candidate that wins a plurality of the vote. This creates an element of closure 
that is not seen in other non-parliamentary democracies. France, for example, directly elects its 
president, but does so in two rounds of voting if no candidate wins a majority of the votes on the 
first round.107 Therefore, many candidates will run at the start of a campaign simply hoping to 
make it into the top two that get to compete in the second round and are thus guaranteed a 
majority. While there is certainly nothing inherently wrong about a two-round system, doing the 
same in the United States would present a significantly greater challenge than that faced in 
France. First, the United States is a significantly larger country, both geographically and by 
population. Holding two elections within a few weeks of each other would require mobilizing all 
of the resources that are mobilized for an election at all levels of government twice in a short 
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time frame. Second, the American federal system is well served by having a single day in 
November on which citizens can vote for all offices for which there are elections in their area. 
Even with representation at the local, state, and federal level, Americans do all of their voting on 
a single day. Asking voters to come out to their polling place again a few weeks later to cast a 
single vote for president would simply seem silly when a voter’s interests were already expressed 
at so many other levels of government, which leads into the final point. Turnout could easily be 
expected to decline sharply on this second round of voting as voters who initially chose a 
candidate that did not reach the final round would be even more disincentivized to vote, selecting 
their second or third choice candidate and nothing else, having expressed their desires for other 
offices weeks earlier. As seen in the most recent French presidential election in 2017, turnout 
declined 13% from the first round to the second, a decrease of almost five million votes in France 
and nearly 18 million votes in the United States.108 
 A possible solution to the two-round situation would be ranked choice voting, in which 
voters select multiple candidates on a single ballot and rank them in order of preference. To date, 
only one state, Maine, uses ranked choice voting for presidential elections but the first election 
in which it will be used is 2020.109 How well ranked choice works in Maine will be closely 
monitored, but historically, it has been difficult to implement ranked choice voting in two-party 
systems like the United States. Much like a traditional direct election system, a possible effect, 
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as will be discussed shortly, would be the proliferation of third-party campaigns and candidates 
for the presidency.  
 Another consequence of direct election would be the opening up of the United States 
presidential election to third-party candidates. As it currently stands, third-party candidates in 
American elections stand effectively zero chance of winning the presidency due to the winner-
take-all nature of the races in each of the states. Ross Perot provides perhaps the best example 
of a nationally popular third-party candidate that failed to register on the electoral chart. Running 
as an independent candidate in 1992, Perot finished the campaign with almost 19% of the 
popular vote yet failed to receive a single electoral vote.110 Because Perot did not win the plurality 
of the votes in any of the states, he did not receive the electoral votes from those states. 
However, in the same vein, a third-party candidate with strong support in a particular state or 
region can disproportionately impact the electoral vote. The premier example of the strong 
regional candidate is George Wallace mounting a third-party campaign in the 1968 election. 
Known for his segregationist stances, Wallace won five states and 46 electoral votes in the South 
with 13.5% of the popular vote.111 Despite underperforming Perot by roughly five percentage 
points, Wallace was able to pick up eight percentage points more electoral votes than Perot by 
having a concentrated base of support in a few states. Even with his concentrated base of 
support, however, Wallace was afflicted by the tendency of the Electoral College to 
underrepresent the support a losing candidate holds while overstating support for a winning one. 
Although moving to a direct election system would not move Perot or Wallace any closer to 
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actually winning the presidency, it would more accurately reflect the fact that Perot 
outperformed Wallace nationally, even if the electoral votes would say otherwise, a more 
democratically intuitive outcome.  
 Perhaps the biggest sticking point about proposals to move to direct election is the 
resulting change in campaign and party strategy that would accompany the move. A common 
line of attack on the Electoral College of today is that presidential elections are only ever decided 
by a handful of so-called swing states that have populations that could swing either direction 
with their support. When most other states can pretty easily be sorted out into electoral piles for 
one candidate or the other, the few that cannot receive the lion’s share of advertising dollars, 
handshakes, and stump speeches as each candidate seeks their route to the 270 votes needed to 
secure the presidency. The relatively small proportion of the population that ends up deciding 
the election is often much derided by opponents of the Electoral College. Instead, if direct 
election were in effect, candidates would be best served by campaigning strictly in the most 
populous areas of the country where their advertising dollars, rallies, and campaign events would 
be most effective. Why go to small town Ohio when you can go to coastal California, New York 
City, or Chicago?  
 As with each of the other plans, there are winners and losers to direct election. The 
winners would be the regions just mentioned and other high population, high density areas that 
can deliver a large trove of votes at low cost. Some other winners would be third parties and their 
candidates, long sequestered to the fringes of American politics and elections by the Democratic 
and Republican Parties, as well as those that seek a more straightforward electoral system that 
is easier to understand. Politically speaking, Democrats would certainly be winners under this 
 38 
plan as their support is heavily concentrated in America’s urban areas and recent electoral history 
has them winning increasing proportions of the popular vote each election cycle. The losers 
under direct election would be those states that are lucky enough to be deemed swing states in 
any given election cycle, a title that is significantly fickler than population trends are. Rural areas 
also major losers under this plan, as they would essentially be ignored at the expense of 
campaigning in more efficient areas for vote collecting while today, they are highly sought after 
in the right states.  
 Minority groups are also significantly impacted by this plan, and not in a positive way. 
Under the Electoral College as it stands today, minority groups hold a significantly greater degree 
of power than they would under direct election. In the Electoral College, the presidency is 
decided by what is effectively 51 distinct races that are worth different numbers of electoral 
votes. Each of those races are contested on a much smaller scale than a direct election would be 
contested on. With smaller scale, as Madison would note in Federalist ten, factions and groups 
can have a much larger influence then they can on a larger scale.112 The factionalism that Madison 
hoped to stave off with a larger republic is the same type of power that minority groups would 
seek to exert; the type of power that is most effective in smaller republics. By competing in 
elections that are much smaller than a single national election, minority groups are shielded from 
being drowned out by major population centers and majority groups from faraway regions. Thus, 
under a direct election plan, minority groups would definitely be classified as losers. For example, 
American Indian populations make up a tiny fraction of the population of the United States as a 
whole, but comprise at least five percent of the population in Alaska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, 
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South Dakota, Montana, and North Dakota. When compared to the less than one percent they 
comprise of the United States population as a whole, American Indians in particular are 
disadvantaged by a direct election system.  
 The direct election plan is perhaps the most dramatic of the plans that will be discussed 
in this paper. Involving burning the entire system down and working solely with the nationwide 
popular vote, direct election is appealing as a straightforward and simple democratic option. 
However, when one digs deeper into the functioning of such a system and the groups that would 
be disadvantaged by direct election, serious concerns can be raised about both its simplicity and 
democratic bona fides. For the third plan, we return to simply tweaking the Electoral College, but 
with a little help from Maine and Nebraska.  
The Congressional District Plan 
 The third plan that will be covered is the congressional district plan, also sometimes 
referred to as the proportional plan. The essence of this plan would essentially involve turning 
every state into Maine and Nebraska and using their method of assigning electors based not only 
on the outcome of the popular vote statewide, but on the popular vote in each congressional 
district. As currently constructed, Maine and Nebraska split the allocation of their electoral votes 
into those that represent the statewide preference and those that represent the preference of 
the districts within those states.113 For winning the statewide vote, a candidate receives two 
electoral votes from each state, reflecting the two electoral votes that are assigned based on the 
statewide selection of senators. The remaining electoral votes are distributed based on who wins 
each of the congressional districts within that state, so if candidate A wins the popular vote 
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statewide and in one of the congressional districts and candidate B wins the popular vote in the 
two other congressional districts, candidate A would win three electoral votes and candidate B 
would win two out of the five total this hypothetical state has to allocate. Putting this plan into 
practice would involve changing the remining 48 states to the Maine and Nebraska model for 
electoral allocation, moving them from outliers to trendsetters.  
 The benefits of such a plan are that it would not require a Constitutional Amendment to 
implement and that it would lessen the spread that can feasibly occur between the popular vote 
and the electoral vote. Due to the wide latitude that states are given when it comes to allocating 
the electoral votes that they are assigned; no constitutional amendment would need to be 
passed in order to make such a plan a reality. As Maine and Nebraska have already shown, 
moving to this method of allocation would simply require an act of the state legislature. However, 
whether it is easier to pass a constitutional amendment or convince 48 state legislatures to move 
to this system is up for debate. Additionally, without a firm, federal statute that would hold states 
to this system, the same game theoretic forces that drove the vast majority of the states to adopt 
a winner-take-all system would still be present. California would likely be hesitant to hamstring 
its own power in selecting the president by splitting its 55 electoral votes across its congressional 
districts. As for the effect that such a plan would have on the risk of a mismatch between the 
popular and electoral vote totals, the risk would be lowered by the decrease in the distortions of 
the winner-take-all system. By making each district rather than each state an independent 
contest, the absolute size of a margin of victory in an individual district is significantly limited. 
Without the ability to run up huge margins without sacrificing any electoral votes, it would 
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become significantly more difficult to win an election without winning the popular vote. 
However, this plan would create some other distortions of its own. 
 One of the first distortions would come in the effect it would have on the power of 
differently sized states. As currently constructed, the Electoral College favors voters in small 
states over large states. By guaranteeing a minimum of three electoral votes per state, the voters 
per electoral vote ratio in Wyoming is significantly lower than that in California, making a vote in 
Wyoming count for relatively more than a vote in California. Under the congressional district 
plan, that gap would be widened. Smaller states have fewer congressional districts across which 
to allocate their share of the electoral votes, making it more likely that a candidate can sweep all 
of the votes from a small state and effectively maintaining the power that that state held under 
the winner-take-all system. For example, since Maine implemented the congressional district 
plan in 1972 and Nebraska did in 1996, only twice, in 2008 and 2016, has either of the states split 
their electoral vote.114 A large state, on the other hand, has more districts across which to allocate 
electoral votes. With more districts comes a higher risk of splitting the electoral votes of that 
state across multiple candidates, further weakening the power that that state holds in selecting 
the president and the power of the majority in that state to wield that power as well.  
 A second distortion would arise in how congressional districts get treated in an election 
under this system. If congressional districts are to count for the allocation of electoral votes as 
well as the election of United States representatives, a presidential election simply moves from 
being about winning states to winning districts. The same electoral phenomenon that results in 
a handful of swing states deciding an election every four years would move to a smaller 
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subdivision with the creation of swing districts. As much as some Americans bristle at the 
prospect of Floridians and Ohioans deciding who the president will be, imagine the response to 
an election decided by the voters of a congressional district in suburban Atlanta or Chicago. 
Furthermore, unlike states, the borders and makeups of congressional districts change every ten 
years and it is no secret that those borders are drawn with the interest of the ruling party at the 
time in mind. Gerrymandering districts would take on a whole new level of importance, deciding 
not only who gets the majority in the House of Representatives, but also the White House.  
 As no voting system is neutral, this plan creates its own winners and losers just as each of 
the others. The winners in this system would be those that believe mismatch elections are a stain 
on American democracy. While it would not eliminate the possibility of a mismatch entirely as 
direct election would, it would certainly lower the probability of such an election taking place 
and the scale at which it would take place. Additionally, small states would be winners in this 
scenario as many would see their already disproportionate power unchanged or changed very 
little while big states would see significant decreases thus making them losers.  
 A final major winner under this plan might be minority groups. As much as the Electoral 
College already helps minority groups wield political power by breaking elections into 51 
individual races, the congressional district plan would operate similarly but to an even greater 
degree by breaking races into 485 races with slight overlaps in 50 of them. However, there is a 
risk that minorities are gerrymandered into districts where their votes are drowned out by a 
larger majority, thus leaving the true benefit or cost to them somewhat dependent on where 
they live.  
 43 
 While this plan does not require a constitutional amendment to put into practice, it does 
require the full cooperation of all the states in order to be effective. The next plan, the interstate 
compact, similarly does not require a constitutional amendment to implement, but only requires 
the willing participation of enough states to set the course for the entire country.  
The Interstate Compact 
 The interstate compact refers to the plan that is perhaps the closest to becoming a reality. 
Already signed onto by 15 states and the District of Columbia, the compact pledges each of its 
signatories to cast their electoral votes for the winner of the nationwide popular vote.115 
However, the compact only comes into effect when the 270 vote threshold of electoral votes is 
accounted for amongst the states that have signed on, thus guaranteeing that the winner of the 
popular vote nationwide, regardless of where those votes originate from, would win the requisite 
electoral votes to become president.116 To date, that threshold has not been reached and no 
states controlled by Republicans have signed on, likely due to the recognition, in light of Trump’s 
election in 2016, that it would hurt their candidates if it were to come into effect.117 Additionally, 
while the interstate compact would not require a constitutional amendment to become effective 
as it only operates within the latitude of the states to decide how their electors are selected, 
interstate compacts do require approval from Congress, as “No State shall, without the Consent 
of Congress...enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State,” approval that would be 
unlikely to come as long as Republicans control at least one of the House of Representatives or 
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Senate.118 It appears that this clause would conflict with the clause in Article II that gives sole 
discretion to the states to decide how to allocate their electors, however, only a court ruling 
would provide clarity on the issue. 
 Because this plan is essentially just engineering the Electoral College into a direct election 
apparatus, the resulting impact on the country at large would remain very similar to that of direct 
election. The same questions regarding who wins when no one wins a majority would arise, but 
also include the aforementioned question of approval. Just as discussed above, the winners 
under this plan would be high population and high-density regions of the country that can deliver 
many votes efficiently. As one can tell by the concentrated support for the compact in Democrat-
controlled states, Democrats would win under this proposal while Republicans would lose as 
moving to essentially a winner-take-all system would favor large urban centers that tend to 
deliver huge quantities of votes for Democrats. Same for the impact on minority groups. By 
turning smaller elections into a huge nationwide election, the risk of being drowned out by an 
overwhelming majority on the other side of the country is a significant risk, lessening their ability 
to wield political power and have their concerns heard.  
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Chapter IV: The Wyoming Plan 
 While the four proposals that were discussed prior are each legitimate proposals for the 
replacement or alteration of the Electoral College with varying degrees of seriousness and 
likelihoods of being implemented, as well as their own pros and cons, this final proposal is one 
that will be examined significantly more in depth and with the goal of convincing the reader of 
its merits. The so-called Wyoming Rule has gotten significantly less play in the popular media but 
includes many of the same hallmarks of the plans previously discussed. For example, the 
Wyoming Rule would correct some of the perceived injustices of the Electoral College system 
while also having a clear, albeit similarly less than pragmatic, path to implementation. Named for 
the current least-populous state in the Union, the Wyoming Rule relies on that smallest statewide 
population as an integral divisor for the rule. Under a Wyoming Rule system, every ten years 
following the decennial United States Census, Congress would resize itself to ensure that there 
were enough representatives to make the average population of a congressional district close to 
the size of the least populous state. Following that, seats in the House of Representatives would 
be apportioned as they currently are using a mathematical formula that is outside the realm of 
discussion for this paper.  
 Implementing the Wyoming Rule would require no changes to the United States 
Constitution, instead involving only an act of Congress every ten years and the political inertia to 
make it so. Not changing the Constitution means maintaining the Electoral College as it is. It 
would still be composed of electors chosen by the states, still select the president following 
election day, and electors would still be allocated among the states as the sum total of a states’ 
congressional delegation. The effect of the Wyoming Rule comes in as a change to the states’ 
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congressional delegation. By adding or subtracting seats in the House of Representatives every 
census, the size of congressional delegations would change more frequently and thus so would 
the number of electors a state had in the Electoral College. By maintaining the function of the 
Electoral College as currently constructed, the Wyoming Rule in itself does nothing in terms of 
changing the validity or fairness of the presidential electoral system. Instead, the Wyoming Rule 
seeks to mitigate some of the electoral inequities that are present in the American electoral 
system as its method of improving the perceived fairness and validity of American elections.  
 Due to the Constitutional mandate of each state, regardless of population, receiving a 
minimum of one representative and two senators, the lowest number of electoral votes a state 
can cast is three. With a guarantee of two senators for every state, small states and their 
residents are able to wield outsized power by having fewer people per electoral vote that is cast. 
For example, Wyoming, the least populated state as of the 2010 Census, has 187,875 people per 
each of its three Electoral College votes.119 California, by contrast as the most populated state, 
had 677,345 people per each of its 55 Electoral College votes.120 Therefore, a voter in Wyoming 
is over three and a half times as powerful when casting a vote for president than a voter in 
California, with the other 48 states falling somewhere in between. However, it is not only the 
inclusion of two senators that skews the electoral math in Wyoming’s favor.  
 The second culprit of the influence that Wyoming holds is the one representative that the 
state receives. As of the 2010 Census, the average congressional district in the United States had 
708,377 people represented by a single representative.121 Wyoming’s population in 2010 was 
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only 563,625, meaning that compared to the average American, Wyoming’s citizens were 
overrepresented.122 While representation in Congress is not the focus of this paper, it still plays 
an important role in how states are represented in the Electoral College. Since the passage of the 
Reapportionment Act of 1929, Congress has had its size fixed at 435 seats with only one exception 
in 1959 when Alaska and Hawaii were admitted to the Union and each received a single 
representative outside of the normal reapportionment process.123 In the time since, the 
population of the United States has increased dramatically without a corresponding increase in 
seats, leading to the swelling of congressional districts and the spread between the district sizes 
that is seen today. The combination of ever-larger districts and the Constitutional guarantee of 
two senators per state has created the inequalities of representation that are seen today. While 
the number of senators per state is something that cannot be changed without changing the very 
fabric of American representative government, the sizes of congressional districts is something 
that can as they have throughout the growth of the nation. That is exactly what the Wyoming 
Rule seeks to do.  
The Math 
 As mentioned earlier, the way that seats are apportioned in the United States Congress 
is determined by a mathematical formula consisting of square roots, divisors, and variables that 
is far beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, the tables below will provide the necessary 
information for understanding where the Wyoming Rule would start from and the impact it 
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would have on the way Congress and the Electoral College is formed. The table below provides 
the states and their populations as of the 2010 census and the number of seats and electoral 
votes allocated to each, as well as a simple calculation of the number of citizens per electoral 
college vote in each state.124 
State Population Seat Count Electoral Votes People per Electoral Vote 
Alabama 4,779,735 7 9 531,082 
Alaska 710,230 1 3 236,743 
Arizona 6,392,015 9 11 581,092 
Arkansas 2,915,920 4 6 485,987 
California 37,253,955 53 55 677,345 
Colorado 5,029,195 7 9 558,799 
Connecticut 3,574,095 5 7 510,585 
Delaware 897,935 1 3 299,312 
Florida 18,801,310 27 29 648,321 
Georgia 9,687,655 14 16 605,478 
Hawaii 1,360,300 2 4 340,075 
Idaho 1,567,580 2 4 391,895 
Illinois 12,830,630 18 20 641,532 
Indiana 6,483,800 9 11 589,436 
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Iowa 3,046,355 4 6 507,726 
Kansas 2,853,120 4 6 475,520 
Kentucky 4,339,365 6 8 542,421 
Louisiana 4,533,370 6 8 566,671 
Maine 1,328,360 2 4 332,090 
Maryland 5,773,550 8 10 577,355 
Massachusetts 6,547,630 9 11 595,239 
Michigan 9,883,640 14 16 617,728 
Minnesota 5,303,925 8 10 530,393 
Mississippi 2,967,295 4 6 494,549 
Missouri 5,988,925 8 10 598,893 
Montana 989,415 1 3 329,805 
Nebraska 1,826,340 3 5 365,268 
Nevada 2,700,550 4 6 450,092 
New Hampshire 1,316,470 2 4 329,118 
New Jersey 8,791,895 12 14 627,993 
New Mexico 2,059,180 3 5 411,836 
New York 19,378,100 27 29 668,210 
North Carolina 9,535,485 13 15 635,699 
North Dakota 672,590 1 3 224,197 
Ohio 11,536,505 16 18 640,917 
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Oklahoma 3,751,350 5 7 535,907 
Oregon 3,831,075 5 7 547,296 
Pennsylvania 12,702,380 18 20 635,119 
Rhode Island 1,052,565 2 4 263,141 
South Carolina 4,625,365 7 9 513,929 
South Dakota 814,180 1 3 271,393 
Tennessee 6,346,105 9 11 576,919 
Texas 25,145,560 36 38 661,725 
Utah 2,763,885 4 6 460,648 
Vermont 625,740 1 3 208,580 
Virginia 8,001,025 11 13 615,463 
Washington 6,724,540 10 12 560,378 
West Virginia 1,852,995 3 5 370,599 
Wisconsin 5,686,985 8 10 568,699 
Wyoming 563,625 1 3 187,875 
As one can see, the variation in people per electoral vote is wide, ranging from Wyoming to 
California. For the more statistically minded, below are some summary statistics for the people 
per electoral vote:  
Average 491,941 
Median 533,494 
Standard Deviation 139,431 
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To calculate what the size of Congress would have been following the 2010 Census under the 
Wyoming Rule, one simply takes the population of the entire country less Washington, District 
of Columbia and divides it by the population of the smallest state, Wyoming. That calculation 
would be 308,143,795 divided by 563,625 for an answer of 547 after some light rounding.125 For 
comparison, there are currently 435 seats in the House of Representatives meaning that the 
implementation of the Wyoming Rule following the 2010 Census would have added 112 seats to 
Congress.126 Now that a seat number has been calculated, one can simply use the preexisting 
apportionment method and add seats to the equation in order to get the hypothetical seat counts 
and corresponding electoral votes. Those are shown below in the table. 
State Seat Count Electoral Votes People per Electoral Vote 
Alabama 9 11 434,521 
Alaska 1 3 236,743 
Arizona 11 13 491,693 
Arkansas 5 7 416,560 
California 66 68 547,852 
Colorado 9 11 457,200 
Connecticut 6 8 446,762 
Delaware 2 4 224,484 
Florida 33 35 537,180 
Georgia 17 19 509,877 
Hawaii 2 4 340,075 
Idaho 3 5 313,516 
Illinois 23 25 513,225 
Indiana 12 14 463,129 
Iowa 5 7 435,194 
Kansas 5 7 407,589 
Kentucky 8 10 433,937 
Louisiana 8 10 453,337 
Maine 2 4 332,090 
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Maryland 10 12 481,129 
Massachusetts 12 14 467,688 
Michigan 18 20 494,182 
Minnesota 9 11 482,175 
Mississippi 5 7 423,899 
Missouri 11 13 460,687 
Montana 2 4 247,354 
Nebraska 3 5 365,268 
Nevada 5 7 385,793 
New Hampshire 2 4 329,118 
New Jersey 16 18 488,439 
New Mexico 4 6 343,197 
New York 34 36 538,281 
North Carolina 17 19 501,868 
North Dakota 1 3 224,197 
Ohio 20 22 524,387 
Oklahoma 7 9 416,817 
Oregon 7 9 425,675 
Pennsylvania 23 25 508,095 
Rhode Island 2 4 263,141 
South Carolina 8 10 462,537 
South Dakota 2 4 203,545 
Tennessee 11 13 488,162 
Texas 45 47 535,012 
Utah 5 7 394,841 
Vermont 1 3 208,580 
Virginia 14 16 500,064 
Washington 12 14 480,324 
West Virginia 3 5 370,599 
Wisconsin 10 12 473,915 
Wyoming 1 3 187,875 
And, just as before, some summary statistics for the statistically inclined: 
Average 413,436 
Median 440,978 
Standard Deviation 101,651 
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Compared to the current system, the Wyoming Rule makes some headway on all three summary 
statistics in mitigating some of the benefit that small state voters get in the electoral college, 
especially in terms of deviation from the mean. With a lower standard deviation, there is less 
spread across states in their relative power and thus a generally more equal distribution of 
power. Here are the statistics side-by-side: 
Measure Current Wyoming Rule Percentage Decrease 
Average 491,941 413,436 16% 
Median 533,494 440,978 17% 
Standard Deviation 139,431 101,651 27% 
More specifically, here are the state-by-state changes in people per electoral vote under the 
Wyoming Rule: 
State Current Wyoming Rule Percentage Decrease 
Alabama 531,082 434,521 18% 
Alaska 236,743 236,743 0% 
Arizona 581,092 491,693 15% 
Arkansas 485,987 416,560 14% 
California 677,345 547,852 19% 
Colorado 558,799 457,200 18% 
Connecticut 510,585 446,762 12% 
Delaware 299,312 224,484 25% 
Florida 648,321 537,180 17% 
Georgia 605,478 509,877 16% 
Hawaii 340,075 340,075 0% 
Idaho 391,895 313,516 20% 
Illinois 641,532 513,225 20% 
Indiana 589,436 463,129 21% 
Iowa 507,726 435,194 14% 
Kansas 475,520 407,589 14% 
Kentucky 542,421 433,937 20% 
Louisiana 566,671 453,337 20% 
Maine 332,090 332,090 0% 
Maryland 577,355 481,129 17% 
Massachusetts 595,239 467,688 21% 
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Michigan 617,728 494,182 20% 
Minnesota 530,393 482,175 9% 
Mississippi 494,549 423,899 14% 
Missouri 598,893 460,687 23% 
Montana 329,805 247,354 25% 
Nebraska 365,268 365,268 0% 
Nevada 450,092 385,793 14% 
New Hampshire 329,118 329,118 0% 
New Jersey 627,993 488,439 22% 
New Mexico 411,836 343,197 17% 
New York 668,210 538,281 19% 
North Carolina 635,699 501,868 21% 
North Dakota 224,197 224,197 0% 
Ohio 640,917 524,387 18% 
Oklahoma 535,907 416,817 22% 
Oregon 547,296 425,675 22% 
Pennsylvania 635,119 508,095 20% 
Rhode Island 263,141 263,141 0% 
South Carolina 513,929 462,537 10% 
South Dakota 271,393 203,545 25% 
Tennessee 576,919 488,162 15% 
Texas 661,725 535,012 19% 
Utah 460,648 394,841 14% 
Vermont 208,580 208,580 0% 
Virginia 615,463 500,064 19% 
Washington 560,378 480,324 14% 
West Virginia 370,599 370,599 0% 
Wisconsin 568,699 473,915 17% 
Wyoming 187,875 187,875 0% 
Therefore, adding seats to Congress would not only help shrink the average congressional district 
and improve representation in Congress, but it would also help close the gap between the 
relatively most powerful voters and the relatively least powerful in presidential elections.  
 In a 2010 Wyoming Rule, because the number of seats increased, no state would have its 
absolute congressional representation and subsequent electoral representation decreased. 
However, a handful of states would see no change in their representation and therefore a 
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decrease in their relative representation as the total number of seats rose. Below is the seat 
counts for the two systems by state.127 
State Current Wyoming Rule Increase 
Alabama 7 9 2 
Alaska 1 1 0 
Arizona 9 11 2 
Arkansas 4 5 1 
California 53 66 13 
Colorado 7 9 2 
Connecticut 5 6 1 
Delaware 1 2 1 
Florida 27 33 6 
Georgia 14 17 3 
Hawaii 2 2 0 
Idaho 2 3 1 
Illinois 18 23 5 
Indiana 9 12 3 
Iowa 4 5 1 
Kansas 4 5 1 
Kentucky 6 8 2 
Louisiana 6 8 2 
Maine 2 2 0 
Maryland 8 10 2 
Massachusetts 9 12 3 
Michigan 14 18 4 
Minnesota 8 9 1 
Mississippi 4 5 1 
Missouri 8 11 3 
Montana 1 2 1 
Nebraska 3 3 0 
Nevada 4 5 1 
New Hampshire 2 2 0 
New Jersey 12 16 4 
New Mexico 3 4 1 
New York 27 34 7 
North Carolina 13 17 4 
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North Dakota 1 1 0 
Ohio 16 20 4 
Oklahoma 5 7 2 
Oregon 5 7 2 
Pennsylvania 18 23 5 
Rhode Island 2 2 0 
South Carolina 7 8 1 
South Dakota 1 2 1 
Tennessee 9 11 2 
Texas 36 45 9 
Utah 4 5 1 
Vermont 1 1 0 
Virginia 11 14 3 
Washington 10 12 2 
West Virginia 3 3 0 
Wisconsin 8 10 2 
Wyoming 1 1 0 
Total 435 547 112 
Ten states—Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming—would see no change in their seat counts. The ten 
highest gainers would be, in order: California, Texas, New York, Florida, Illinois, Pennsylvania, 
Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Ohio. Only California would see double digit gains with 
13 added seats.  
 The people per electoral vote ratio would see changes as well, although not drastic ones. 
Below are the ten states with the lowest ratios in ascending order under the current system as 
well as under the Wyoming Rule.  
Current Wyoming Rule 
Wyoming 187,875 Wyoming 187,875 
Vermont 208,580 South Dakota 203,545 
North Dakota 224,197 Vermont 208,580 
Alaska 236,743 North Dakota 224,197 
Rhode Island 263,141 Delaware 224,484 
South Dakota 271,393 Alaska 236,743 
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Delaware 299,312 Montana 247,354 
New Hampshire 329,118 Rhode Island 263,141 
Montana 329,805 Idaho 313,516 
Maine 332,090 New Hampshire 329,118 
While the order of the states on this list changes completely with the exception of Wyoming, only 
Maine is removed from the first list in favor of Idaho on the second. Although the Wyoming Rule 
would help shrink the gap between the largest and smallest states in terms of relative power, it 
would have a limited impact on the power of the states positionally as the smallest states would 
still be the smallest states. Furthermore, here are the ten states with the highest people to 
electoral vote ratios under both the current and Wyoming Rule systems in descending order. 
Current Wyoming Rule 
California 677,345 California 547,852 
New York 668,210 New York 538,281 
Texas 661,725 Florida 537,180 
Florida 648,321 Texas 535,012 
Illinois 641,532 Ohio 524,387 
Ohio 640,917 Illinois 513,225 
North Carolina 635,699 Georgia 509,877 
Pennsylvania 635,119 Pennsylvania 508,095 
New Jersey 627,993 North Carolina 501,868 
Michigan 617,728 Virginia 500,064 
The pattern is much the same as the prior list, with California and New York topping both lists 
and Pennsylvania claiming the eighth spot on both. New Jersey and Michigan claim spots on the 
first while Georgia and Virginia replace them on the second, again showing the limited room that 
exists for movement to and from positions of power relative to other states. Interesting to note 
is the size of the decreases in people per vote ratio on the second list relative to the first. For 
example, a Wyoming Rule California would be 70 thousand people shy of even making the top 
ten on the highest ratios list under the current system.  
Effects 
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Just as with Chapter III, analyzing the effects that implementing the Wyoming Rule would 
unleash is just as important as understanding the details of the plan itself. Continuing with the 
spirit of the chapter, the analysis of the effects for the Wyoming Rule will take on a more 
thorough approach than some of the more common proposals for altering the Electoral College. 
This section will still cover the same details regarding legality, winners and losers, impact on 
minority groups, and how it addresses some of the issues of the Electoral College as currently 
constructed.  
Legality 
 Part of the appeal of the Wyoming Rule is that it does not require an amendment to the 
Constitution in order to implement. By working within the framework of the Electoral College as 
laid out in the Constitution, notably the stipulation that a state gets electoral votes equal to the 
sum total of the representatives and senators a state sends to Congress, the Wyoming Rule is 
able to be fully implemented without passing a constitutional amendment. The only legal change 
that would need to be made is the addition of seats to the United States House of 
Representatives. As mentioned in earlier in the chapter, Congress can legislate its own size as 
only the size of the Senate is constitutionally mandated at two senators per state. Even with that 
power, Congress has not permanently changed the size of the House of Representatives since 
the Reapportionment Act of 1929, which set the size of the House at the 435 seats that it remains 
at today.128 The only deviation from 435 occurred in 1959 when Alaska and Hawaii were admitted 
to the Union.129 Instead of reapportioning the entirety of the House of Representatives just one 
                                                        
128 United States House of Representatives: History, Art & Archives, “Proportional Representation.” 
129 United States House of Representatives: History, Art & Archives, “Proportional Representation.” 
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year in advance of the next census, Congress instead granted the two newest states one 
representative each until the completion of the 1960 Census and subsequent 
reapportionment.130 
 While putting the Wyoming Rule into place would only require an act of Congress to 
increase the number of seats in the House of Representatives, the legal challenge will come in 
with ensuring that that process reoccurs every ten years after each census. The only way to 
ensure that Congress is legally required to repeat the process decennially would be to pass an 
amendment to the Constitution, slightly defeating the purpose of pursuing the Wyoming Rule to 
begin with. Although Congress could technically be trusted to make the requisite changes 
themselves, planning a decade into the future is much easier than confronting political realities 
in the present. Thus, if the party in power in a given census year projected to be a major loser as 
a result of resizing and reapportionment, the political will to make even a routine and technical 
correction to American government could quickly evaporate. As soon as something as 
nonpartisan as maintaining the functions of American government becomes a political tool, the 
Wyoming Rule becomes less of a rule and more a method of wielding and maintaining power. 
For this reason, any serious proposal seeking to implement the Wyoming Rule should seek to 
create guardrails against the political weaponization of congressional size.  
Winners and Losers 
 Just as with each of the plans before, an analysis of winners and losers under the 
Wyoming Rule is in order. Winners would include people that believe that the Electoral College 
is a suitable method for selecting the president and would prefer to leave it intact. Similarly, 
                                                        
130 United States House of Representatives: History, Art & Archives, “Proportional Representation.” 
 60 
those that generally are okay with the Electoral College but believe that some more incremental 
changes are needed in order to keep it relevant for the 21st century could be considered winners. 
However, those that would like to see sweeping changes to the electoral system of the United 
States—whether via direct election or another method that would require constitutional 
change—would be disappointed in the simple tinkering of the system that comes with the 
Wyoming Rule. However, there is very limited middle ground. A sizable cadre of minor changes, 
like implementing the automatic plan or electing electors by district instead of by state, would 
require constitutional amendments. At that point, going through the process of amending the 
Constitution is more appealing if it would involve more drastic change. To many, the amendment 
process is simply not worth it if the resulting change is marginal.  
 Politically, the winners and losers are more difficult to define, if there are easily 
determined winners and losers at all. Although tempting to say that Republicans running for the 
presidency would likely be losers as the low-population states that hold disproportionate power 
in the Electoral College would become relatively weaker as high-population states like California, 
New York, and Illinois gained seats, the exact effect would be difficult to determine due to the 
simple fact that party platforms and campaign strategies would change to reflect a new electoral 
system. Even then, it is difficult to determine if Republicans would have even been losers if the 
2016 election had been conducted via the Wyoming Rule. While an imperfect guide, under the 
Wyoming Rule, if the popular vote counts remained exactly the same, Donald Trump would have 
won 370 electoral votes for his 30 states and Maine’s second district while Hillary Clinton would 
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have won 280 for her 20 states and the District of Columbia.131 Trump’s 57% of the electoral vote 
under the Wyoming Rule would be a tenth of a percentage point more than he won in the actual 
2016 election.132  
 Looking at the only other election to date conducted under 2010 apportionment, 2012, 
Mitt Romney would have won 248 electoral votes for his 24 states to Barack Obama’s 402 for 26 
states and the District of Columbia if the election was under the Wyoming Rule.133 Romney’s 38% 
of the electoral vote is almost exactly what he received in the 2012 election as well.134 While two 
elections are certainly a tiny sample size, the overall effect on political power appears to be 
benign in the absence of broader platform and strategy shifts by the major parties.  
By using the size of Congress to affect how presidential elections are run, Congress would 
also see major changes under the Wyoming Rule. However, how the added congressional seats 
would affect the balance of power in the legislature is highly dependent on a multitude of other 
factors, including who controls redistricting in various states and how campaigning would change 
to reflect new political realities. In terms of the power of individual legislators, their individual 
power would decrease as seats are added, although the power of the House as an institution 
would likely remain unchanged relative to the Senate. Select members of the House, like the 
Speaker of the House and committee chairs, would probably see their power increase as they 
wield influence over a larger number of representatives and their political operations.  
                                                        
131 “Federal Elections 2016,” Federal Election Commission, published December 2017, 
https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2016/federalelections2016.pdf. 
132 Federal Election Commission, “Federal Elections 2016.” 
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 Continuing on the same vein, small states would be major losers under the Wyoming Rule 
as they would see larger states gain lots of seats without picking up many themselves. Not only 
would their congressional delegation shrink relative to the size of other states, but their power 
in selecting the president would be significantly diminished as well. However, even with a smaller 
number of electoral votes and power in the Electoral College, small states would still punch above 
their weight on a people per electoral vote basis. By virtue of the way the Electoral College is 
designed, the inclusion of two senators for every state regardless of size and the counting of 
those senators in the Electoral College will always overrepresent small state residents against big 
state residents. Adding seats to large states via the Wyoming Rule would only help narrow the 
gap.  
Minority Groups 
 As a bit of an extension to the previous section on winners and losers, how the Wyoming 
Rule impacts the fortunes of minority groups also merits discussion. Generally speaking, the 
implementation of the Wyoming Rule would be good for minority groups. As discussed in Chapter 
II, the Electoral College is a boon for minority groups when compared to a nationwide popular 
election. By breaking the country into 51 distinct elections, minority groups within a state can 
exert more influence over the outcome of the race in that state. If competing in the context of a 
nationwide election, the influence a minority group can wield is greatly reduced. Expanding on 
the power of minority groups within states, the power wielded by different groups in different 
state varies widely. By making states like California, Texas, and Florida more powerful in electing 
the president, minority groups in those states can exert more influence over the election by 
influencing a greater number of electoral votes. However, competing in a more powerful state 
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also means competing in a more populous state, possibly reducing the influence a minority group 
can exert. As a result, although the Wyoming Rule would make certain minority groups in larger 
states more powerful relative to minority groups in smaller states, it would not change the power 
of the minority groups within their own states in terms of their impact on presidential elections.  
 While the Wyoming Rule is principally designed for altering the method by which the 
President of the United States is elected, by altering the size of Congress the Wyoming Rule also 
creates spillover effects for the representation of citizens in the House of Representatives. 
Minority groups would become winners under this effect as well, as a greater number of 
representatives results in smaller districts and greater representation. With smaller districts, not 
only are minority groups less likely to be lumped into a district with a dominant majority, but 
they are more likely to be the majority themselves. Smaller districts would thus help minorities 
not be powerless in their legislative district and even possibly elect their own representative to 
represent their interests. Although the Wyoming Rule would not eliminate the practice of 
gerrymandering, it would make it more difficult to gerrymander a district that can effectively 
disenfranchise a large swath of minority voters.  
Addressing the Issues 
 The primary issue with the Electoral College as currently constructed that the Wyoming 
Rule is meant to address is the imbalance of relative power between small state residents and 
large state residents. As an extension of that, the Wyoming Rule is also designed to make 
mismatch elections, in which the candidate that wins a majority of the electoral vote does not 
win a plurality of the popular vote, less likely and less extreme. By narrowing the relative power 
gap between small and large states, candidates have a narrower path to winning the presidency 
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without winning a plurality of the popular vote as the states that once provided an outsized 
number of electoral votes relative to their population become less powerful.  
For example, a candidate that wins the same number of votes in California as they would 
under the current electoral system would now receive 68 electoral votes instead of 55. Even to 
simply keep pace, the opposing candidate would need to make up those 13 electoral votes. If the 
opposing candidate was closing that gap with a collection of small states, they would need to win 
the equivalent of seven electoral votes in order to do so. Winning seven electoral votes from the 
opposing candidate thereby deprives the opposition of seven votes in the zero-sum game of 
electoral politics. To put it in the context of the 2016 election, if Hillary Clinton were to receive 
68 electoral votes from California, rather than the 55 she actually received, Donald Trump would 
have to win not only all the states he previously won, but also pull, for example, New Hampshire 
and Vermont from Clinton as well. While Clinton’s popular vote spread in California would remain 
the same, Trump would have to add margins of victory in New Hampshire and Vermont to his 
vote total.  Trump would only need to win seven additional votes from Clinton to make up the 
difference, but Clinton will have done nothing different in order to achieve that lead in the first 
place. Therefore, a candidate that wins a large state with a high population would now win even 
more electoral votes, helping to counteract the Moneyball-esque electoral-for-popular efficiency 
of winning small states with low populations. Although the Electoral College guarantees that 
people per electoral vote will never be an equal ratio across the country, adding seats to the 
House of Representatives via the Wyoming Rule would help narrow the gap.  
Chapter V: Conclusion 
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 To end, I would like to cover why I believe the Wyoming Rule to be the best option for 
bringing the Electoral College into the present and preparing it for the future. To start, I believe 
that the Wyoming Rule has the best probability of actually becoming law for two reasons. First, 
it does not require a constitutional amendment. By only requiring an act of Congress, the 
Wyoming rule can skip the two-thirds majorities in both houses of Congress and the ratification 
by three-fourths of the states, significantly cutting down on the opportunities for derailment. 
Second, as shown by the analysis of what the Wyoming Rule would have done for the 2016 and 
2012 elections, it is currently a completely unpartisan change. Although an ex post analysis of 
previous elections is not an ideal predictor of what would happen under the Wyoming Rule, it is 
the best one can do at the current juncture due to the multitude of factors that would change if 
the Wyoming Rule was implemented. While partisan neutrality would ideally not be a deciding 
factor in how a congressman would vote to overhaul the electoral system of the United States, it 
is a reality of the times that we live in that it is a concern. Compared to the other alternatives 
discussed in this paper, save the automatic plan, the Wyoming Rule is by far the most unpartisan, 
thus giving neither side a political reason to vote against it. As a result, the Wyoming Rule is the 
best chance of getting structural-level electoral reform passed into law in the near future.  
 There are more than just practical reasons to support to Wyoming Rule. I believe that the 
most base-level shortcoming of the Electoral College is the outsized influence it gives small-state 
voters on a people per electoral vote basis. While that ratio will never be the same across every 
state due to the inclusion of two senators in the calculation, it can and should be mitigated at a 
reasonable degree. While one can add seats to the Congress until the ratios are sufficiently small, 
that number of seats could lie in the thousands or tens of thousands. Therefore, by tying the 
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number of seats in Congress to the population of the smallest state, a nice balance is struck 
between narrowing the ratio and maintaining a reasonable number of seats in the House. By not 
using an amendment, the Electoral College and the House of Representatives can still act as the 
framers intend and ebb and flow with the state of the country. If Wyoming was to have a sudden 
population boom, the House could shrink to accommodate the now more even distribution of 
the population across the states. Even with a shrinking House, the best way to improve the spread 
of the ratios of people to electoral vote is to not have such wide disparities in population, making 
the Wyoming Rule a self-correcting mechanism that limits its own influence when that influence 
is less needed.  
 Although this paper focused on the implications the Wyoming Rule would have for 
presidential elections and the Electoral College, adding seats to the House would certainly have 
implications for the functioning of Congress too. At its most basic, adding seats would improve 
representation in Congress by reducing the number of people that live in each congressional 
district. With smaller districts and better representation comes more opportunities for minority 
groups and factions to have their voices heard through an elected representative. Without a 
more detailed analysis that is beyond the purview of this paper, it is impossible to predict how a 
larger House as an institution would have its role altered, nor how individual representatives 
wield the soft power that comes with their position even if they are officially weaker than their 
predecessors in terms of influence on legislation.  
 Finally, I believe that there are wider benefits to American democracy as a whole that the 
Wyoming Rule would usher in. It is no secret that Americans are increasingly being separated 
into more polarized camps. Interparty animosity is high, and each party’s candidates speak of the 
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other party’s candidates with a scorn that was unfathomable just ten years ago. While there is 
certainly an element of politics to the development, I believe there is also a structural basis for 
the divide that starts with the Electoral College. The reasoning is market based. With two major 
parties, each would take policy positions that it believed would win it a slight majority of what 
was at stake. In the case of the presidency, that is electoral votes and in the case of Congress, 
that is seats. Doing anything less would be playing to lose and, at that point, then there is not 
much reason in playing at all. The issue with the Electoral College is that it divorces what is 
needed to win, electoral votes, from democratic intuition, popular votes. In doing so, the 
Electoral College creates opportunities for maximizing outcomes on one metric while ignoring 
the other, for example allowing the Republican Party to win a sizable majority of electoral votes 
with significantly less than a majority of the popular vote. Due to their popularity in generally 
smaller states that happen to be relatively more powerful in the Electoral College than large ones, 
the Republican Party is able to stake out a platform further to the right than would be necessary 
to win a majority of the popular vote. If the advantage held by smaller states was not as large, 
then the Republican Party and their candidate would have to move closer to the middle to bring 
more states into play. A similar logic holds for the Democratic Party as well. Recognizing that the 
Republicans are moving further right, Democrats are given the ability to move further left without 
losing the states they would win otherwise. By refusing to compete in a state like California, 
Republicans give Democrats free reign to move left without fear of losing California.  
 The greatest threat that American democracy faces is democracy itself. If polarization and 
division become the norm and moderation and compromise become relics of a bygone era, the 
United States will struggle to keep the pieces intact. Although it is more speculation than 
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anything, I believe that the Wyoming Rule is an excellent way to help ensure that the structures 
of American democracy do not ultimately contribute to its demise. Combined with the relative 
ease of putting it into practice, the narrowing of ratios of people to popular vote across states, 
and the improved representation in the legislature, the Wyoming Rule is the clear choice for 
Electoral College reform and, with it, democratic reform for the American republic.  
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